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ABSTRACT  
Over a Past Few YearsCloud security is one of most important issues that has attracted a lot of research and 
development,Especially Attackers can Find explore vulnerabilities of a cloud system and compromise virtual 
machines  to  deploy  further  large-scale  Distributed  Denial-of-Service  (DDoS).As  DDoS  Attacks  Usually 
Involves Early Stage Actions the Detection of Zombie Exploration Attacks is Extremely Difficult Because of 
Cloud Users May Install Vulnerable Applications on Their Virtual Machines .To Prevent this Condition we 
Propose  a  Multi-Phase  ,Distributed  Vulnerability  Detection  Measurement  and  Counter  Measure  Selection 
Mechanism called NICE  Implementation. This Model is built on Attack Graph Based Analytical Models and 
Re-Configurable Virtual Network Based Counter Measures. A Scenario Attack Graph Technique is Used to 
Prevent  the Attacker while he wants to Enter to Other User/Server in the Network. As NICE Proposes Three 
Models, Where Scenario Attack Graph is Proved asPreferred Model. 
INDEX TERMS: Attack Graph, Cloud Computing, Intrusion Detection, Network Security, Zombie Detection 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A  recent  Cloud  Security  Alliance  (CSA) 
survey  shows that among all security  issues, abuse 
and nefarious use of cloud computing is considered 
as  the  top  security  threat,  in  which  attackers  can 
exploit  vulnerabilities  in  clouds  and  utilize  cloud 
system resources to deploy attacks. In traditional data 
centres,  where  system  administrators  have  full 
control over the host machines, vulnerabilities can be 
detected and patched by the system administrator in a 
centralized manner.  
However, patching known security holes in 
cloud data  centres,  where cloud users  usually  have 
the  privilege  to  control  softwareinstalled  on  their 
managed  VMs,  may  not  work  effectively  and  can 
violate  the  Service  Level  Agreement  (SLA). 
Furthermore,  cloud  users  can  install  vulnerable 
software on their VMs, which essentially contributes 
to  loopholes  in  cloud  security.  The  challenge  is  to 
establish  an  effective  vulnerability/attack  detection 
and  response  system  for  accurately  identifying 
attacks and minimizing the impact of security breach 
to cloud users. 
To  establish  a  defence-in-depth  Intrusion 
Detection  Framework,  We  Propose  NICE.  In  this 
article,  we  propose  NICE  (Network  Intrusion 
detection  and  Countermeasure  Selection  in  virtual 
network  systems)  to  establish  a  defense-in-depth 
intrusion  detection  framework.  For  better  attack 
detection, NICE incorporates attack graph analytical 
procedures into the intrusion detection processes. We 
must note that the design of NICE does not intend to 
improve  any  of  the  existing  intrusion  detection 
algorithms; indeed, NICE employs a reconfigurable 
virtual networking approach to detect and counter the  
 
attempts  to  compromise  VMs,  thus  preventing 
zombie VMs 
Actually, NICE includes two main phases: 
(1)  deploy  a  lightweight  mirroring  based  network 
intrusion  detection  agent  (NICE-A)  on  each  cloud 
server to capture and analyse cloud traffic. A NICE-
A periodically scans the virtual systemvulnerabilities 
within  a  cloud  server  to  establish  Scenario  Attack 
Graph  (SAGs),  and  then  based  on  the  severity  of 
identified  vulnerability  towards  the  collaborative 
attack goals, NICE will decide whether or not to put a 
VM  in  network  inspection  state.  (2)  Once  a  VM 
enters inspection state, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) 
is  applied,  and/or  virtual  network  reconfigurations 
can be deployed to the inspecting VM to make the 
potential attack behaviours prominent. 
 
II.  NICE MODELS 
Basically,NICE Consists of Three Models  
 
2.1 Threat Model 
The  attacker‟s  primary  goal  is  to  exploit 
vulnerable VMs and compromise them as zombies. 
Our  protection  model  focuses  on  virtual-network-
based attack detection and reconfiguration solutions 
to improve the resiliency to zombie explorations. Our 
work does not involve host-based IDS and does not 
address  how  to  handle  encrypted  traffic  for  attack 
detections. Our proposed solution can be deployed in 
an  Infrastructure-as-a-Service  (IaaS)  cloud 
networking  system,  and  we  assume  that  the  Cloud 
Service Provider (CSP) is benign. We also assume 
that cloud service users are free to install whatever 
operating systems or applications they want, even if 
such  action  may  introduce  vulnerabilities  to  their 
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controlled VMs. Physical security of cloud server is 
out  of  scope  of  this  paper.  We  assume  that  the 
hypervisor is secure and free of any vulnerability. 
 
2.2 Attack Graph Model 
An  attack  graph  is  a  modelling  tool  to 
illustrate  all  possible  multi-stage,  multi-host  attack 
paths that are crucial to understand threats and then to 
decide appropriate countermeasures.Since the attack 
graph provides details of all known vulnerabilities in 
the system and the connectivity information, we get a 
whole  picture  of  current  security  situation  of  the 
system where we can predict the possible threats and 
attacks by correlating detected events or activities. If 
an event is recognized as a potential attack, we can 
apply specific countermeasures to mitigate its impact 
or take actions to prevent it from contaminating the 
cloud system. 
 
Definition  1(Scenario  Attack  Graph).  An  Scenario 
Attack Graph is a tuple SAG=(V, E), where 
1.  V  =  NC∪ND∪NR  denotes  a  set  of  vertices  that 
include three types namely conjunction node NC to 
represent  exploit,  disjunction  node  ND  to  denote 
result of exploit, and root node NR for showing initial 
step of an attack scenario. 
 
2. E = Epre ∪Epost denotes the set of directed edges. 
An edge e ∈Epre ⊆ND × NC represents that NDmust 
be satisfied to achieve NC. An edge e ∈Epost ⊆NC × 
ND means that the consequence shown by NDcan be 
obtained if NC is satisfied. Node vc ∈NC is defined 
as a three tuple(Hosts, vul, alert) representing a set of 
IP addresses,vulnerability information such as CVE 
[23],  and  alertsrelated  to  vc,  respectively.  ND 
behaves  like  a  logical  ORoperation  and  contains 
details of the results of actions.NR represents the root 
node of the scenario attack graph. 
 
Definition 2(Alert Correlation Graph). An ACG is a 
three tuple ACG = (A,E, P), where 
1. A is a set of aggregated alerts. An alert a ∈A is a 
data structure (src, dst, cls, ts) representing source 
IP address, destination IP address, type of the alert, 
and timestamp of the alert respectively. 
 
2. Each alert a maps to a pair of vertices (vc, vd) in 
SAG using map(a) function, i.e., map(a) : a _→{(vc, 
vd)|(a.src ∈vc.Hosts) ∧(a.dst ∈vd.Hosts) ∧ 
(a.cls = vc.vul)}. 
 
3.  E  is  a  set  of  directed  edges  representing 
correlation  between  two  alerts  (a,  a_)  if  criteria 
below satisfied: 
i. (a.ts < a_.ts) ∧(a_.ts − a.ts < threshold) 
ii.  ∃(vd,  vc)  ∈Epre  :  (a.dst  ∈vd.Hosts  ∧a_.src 
∈vc.Hosts) 
4. P is set of paths in ACG. A path Si ⊂P is a set of 
related alerts in chronological order. We assume that 
A  contains  aggregated  alerts  ratherthan  raw  alerts. 
Raw  alerts  having  same  source  anddestination  IP 
addresses,  attack  type  and  timestampwithin  a 
specified window are aggregated as Meta Alerts. 
 
III. Related Theory 
3.1  Existing Model 
In the Existing  System, When an  Attacker 
Attacks  the  User/Server  in  the  Network  which  are 
especially  Infrastructure-as-a-Service[IaaS]  based 
Servers, detection of effected Servers are Extremely 
Difficult because of cloud Users may install multiple 
Types  of  Software  in  the  Server  with  their  User 
Account.Existing  work  generally  focuses  on 
measuring  individual  vulnerabilities  instead  of 
measuring their combined effects.  
 
3.2  Proposed Model 
In  the  Proposed  System,  We  propose 
Network  Intrusion  detection  and  Countermeasure 
Selection  to  establish  a  defense-in-depth  intrusion 
detection  framework  for  better  attack  detection, 
Network  Intrusion  detection  and  Countermeasure 
Selection  incorporates  attack  graph  analytical 
procedures into the intrusion detection processes. 
When  an  Attacker  Attacks  the  Server  by 
using a User Account, Attacker can Deploy Multiple 
Levels of Malwares to the Server, If and only if he 
can Access to the Server, but in Existing System its 
Hard to Detect the Attacker because of  Server Cloud 
Service  .  While  in  Proposed,  When  an  Attacker 
Attacks the Server using User Account, the  Attack 
Analyzer  can  Detect  the  Attacker  and  Send  the 
Warning to Administrator that User[Attacked by the 
Zombie]  try  to  Access  to  Other  Users  Account  to 
Deploy the Multiple Levels of Malware and Admin 
waits for Maximum Attempts and then Admin Blocks 
him Permanently using Scenario Attack Graph.  
 
Fig 1 : Designed NICE Architecture 
 
The  major  functions  of  NICE  system  are 
performed  by  attack  analyzer,  which  includes 
procedures  such  as  attack  graph  construction  and 
update,  alert  correlation  and  countermeasure 
selection. The process of constructing and  utilizing 
the  Scenario  Attack  Graph  (SAG)  consists  of  three Mr. V.V.Prathap et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications               www.ijera.com 
ISSN : 2248-9622, Vol. 4, Issue 3( Version 5), March 2014, pp.75-80 
 
 
www.ijera.com                                                                                                                                77 | P a g e  
phases:  information  gathering,  attack  graph 
construction,  and  potential  exploit  path  analysis. 
With  this  information,  attack  paths  can  be  model 
using SAG. Each node in the attack graph represents 
an exploit by the attacker. Each path from an initial 
node to a goal node represents a successful attack. 
 
Algorithm :: 
Alert Correlation 
Require: alert ac, SAG, ACG 
1: if (ac is a new alert) then 
2: create node ac in ACG 
3: n1 ← vc ∈map(ac) 
4: for all n2 ∈parent(n1) do 
5: create edge (n2.alert, ac) 
6: for all Si containing a do 
7: if a is the last element in Si then 
8: append ac to Si 
9: else 
10: create path Si+1 = {subset(Si, a), ac} 
11: end if 
12: end for 
13: add ac to n1.alert 
14: end for 
15: end if 
16: return S 
 
Above method for utilizing SAG and ACG 
together  so  as  to  predict  an  attacker‟s  behaviour. 
Alert  Correlation  algorithm  is  followed  for  every 
alert detected and returns one or more paths Si.For 
every  alert  ac  that  is  received  from  the  IDS,  it  is 
added to ACG if it does not exist. For thisnew alert 
ac, the corresponding vertex in the SAG is found by 
using function map. 
 
Fig 2 : Counter-Measure Model 
 
Algorithm presents how to select the optimal 
countermeasure for a given attack scenario. Input to 
the algorithm is an alert, attack graph G, and a pool 
of  countermeasures  CM.  The  algorithm  starts  by 
electing the node vAlert that corresponds to the alert 
generated  by  a  NICE-A.  Before  selecting  the 
countermeasure, we count the distance of  vAlert to 
the  target  node.  If  the  distance  is  greater  than  a 
threshold value, we do not perform countermeasure 
selection but update the ACG to keep track of alerts 
in the system. 
 
IV. Step-by-Step Procedure  to Prevent 
Attack 
The below Figures Shows Every Moment of 
Application  while  Running  It  gives  the  clear 
elaborated of application. It will be useful for the new 
user to understand for the future steps. 
 
Intrusion Detection Model: 
 
Fig3 : Registration Process 
 
In  above  figure  describes  registration 
process  where  user  is  provides  his  own  details  for 
registering    and  he  is  will  be  getting  login  on 
successful registration or else if he fails to provide 
any of the details he will not be  allowed to register  
thereby he is not allowed to login    
 
Attack Graph Model:  
 
Fig 4 : User Profile 
 
After successful login he is allowed to enter 
the application profile, from there onwards what are 
the  information  he  may  want  to  get  he  is  simply 
access from the application  
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Upload Information 
 
Fig 5 : Uploading a File After Login 
 
In Above Figure describes that a Registered 
User can Access his own Account by Uploading any 
type  of  files,  he  can  only  able  to  have  the  delete 
Option . 
 
Fig 6 : All Files Option 
 
In  Above  Figure  describes  the  User  can 
check the All Files Available in his Cloud Server by 
clicking on “All files” Option in his Account 
 
Fig 7 :Preventing the Deletion 
 
In Above Figure describes, if User tries to 
Delete a file which is Available in Cloud Server it 
shows  “Sorry  You  Cannot  Delete  the 
Files!!!!”because the User will having only “Read-
Write-Remove[RWR]”  only  to  his  Account  not  to 
Remaining Account/Files 
 
 
Fig 8 :: Selection of a Particular File/Format 
 
In Above Figure describes if User having „n‟ 
number of files and he  wants to check a particular 
file/Format,  he  can  access  that  File  in  the  Search 
Option  by  Typing  the  File  name/Format  Type  he 
wants 
 
Fig 9 : Providing a Unique ID 
 
In  Above  Figure  describes  that  for  every 
login  User  having  an  Unique  Secure  ID  in  the 
Application,  for  the  Security  Reasons  and  ID  is 
useful when User request to Administrator to Delete 
a  File,  User  wants  to  Submit  Secure  ID  with  the 
Message which is showing in above figure  
 
Fig 10 : Admin Login Page 
 
In Above Figure describes the Administrator 
Login Page 
 
Fig 11 :Admin Index Mr. V.V.Prathap et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications               www.ijera.com 
ISSN : 2248-9622, Vol. 4, Issue 3( Version 5), March 2014, pp.75-80 
 
 
www.ijera.com                                                                                                                                79 | P a g e  
After  Login,  Administrator  Having  an  7 
Options  Index  of  his  Cloud  Server  and  Virtual 
Machine, Counter-Measure, Graph 
 
Fig 12 : Accessing the Details 
 
In  Above  Figure  describes  the 
Administrator, Access to Cloudserver1 Details which 
shows how many Users are Logged in   
 
Fig 13 : Cloud Server Files 
 
In  Above  Figure  describes  the 
Administrator,  having  an  Access  to  the  Particular 
Users  data  in  the  Cloud  server,  if  Admin  tries  to 
delete a File in the User Account, he can‟t able to 
delete a file without  “Security Key” 
 
Fig 14 : Security Key Request 
 
In  Above  Figure  describes  the 
Administrator,  tries  to  delete  a  File  in  the  User 
Account only by Entering “Security Key” which is 
generated when User Login ,which is shown in Fig 9 
 
Fig 15 :Admin Monitoring Details 
 
In  Above  Figure  describes  the 
Administrator,  Access  to  Counter-Measurewhich  is 
in that a User1[Attacker] who tries to delete files of 
other User2, Admin can see the how many Attempts 
that  Attacker  made    to  delete  Files  of  other  User. 
Admin can also Block the Attacked User who tries to 
delete other User  
 
Fig 16 :Access to VM 
 
In Above Figure describes the Administrator 
Access to Virtual Machine Allocating Storage date of 
Virtual Machine 
 
 
Fig 17: VM Graph 
 
In Above Figure describes the Administrator 
having  Access  to  Virtual  Machine  Graph  which 
shows Data Usage of Particular Virtual Machine in 
Cloud Server 
 
V.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
WORK 
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in the cloud virtual networking environment. NICE 
utilizes  the  attack  graph  model  to  conduct  attack 
detection  and  prediction.  The  proposed  solution 
investigates  how  to  use  the  programmability  of 
software  switches  based  solutions  to  improve  the 
detection  accuracy  and  defeat  victim  exploitation 
phases  of  collaborative  attacks.  The  system 
performance  evaluation  demonstrates  the  feasibility 
of NICE and shows that the proposed solution can 
significantly reduce the risk of the cloud system from 
being exploited and abused by internal and external 
attackers.  NICE  only  investigates  the  network  IDS 
approach to counter zombie explorative attacks. 
In order to improve the detection accuracy, 
host-based  IDS  solutions  are  needed  to  be 
incorporated and to cover the whole\ spectrum of IDS 
in the cloud system. This should be investigated in 
the  future  work.  Additionally,  as  indicatedin  the 
paper,  we  will  investigate  the  scalability  of  the 
proposed  NICE  solution  by  investigating  the 
decentralized  network  control  and  attack  analysis 
model based on current study. 
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